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In January 1940, two important public gatherings took place in Yugoslavia. Speakers 
at the first event, held on 14 January – incidentally, New Year’s Day according to the 
Julian calendar, kept by the Serbian Orthodox Church – praised the Crown and the 
government and expressed their belief that the country was at last united and going in 
the right direction. Prince Regent Paul, Princess Olga and Prime Minister Cvetković 
were present and witnessed in person the support they enjoyed, at least in one part of 
the country. Tens of thousands supporters came to greet them, despite cold weather. 
Speakers at the second event, which took place twelve days later elsewhere in 
Yugoslavia, criticised the government for favouring certain groups at the expense of 
others and expressed their dissatisfaction with the way the Yugoslav state was 
evolving, fearing for its unity.  
One might imagine that the first meeting was organised by Serbs and the 
second by Croats. Interwar Yugoslavia was a Serb-dominated state: constitutions were 
Serb-style centralist, the Serbian Karadjordjević monarchy ruled the country, all but 
one prime minister had been Serb, the army was Serb-dominated. The list goes on. 
Under these circumstances, Croats boycotted state institutions in the early 1920s and 
demanded an equal treatment with Serbs throughout the interwar period. Serbs, on the 
other hand, seemed content with Yugoslavia – or so goes the conventional wisdom, 
according to which the interwar period could be best understood in terms of struggle 
between Serb governments and Croat opposition.  
However, would such a conclusion be a correct one? Was the pro-regime rally 
organised by Serbs? Did Croats convene the anti-government gathering? The answer 
to both questions would be ‘no’. The first meeting took place in Zagreb under the 
auspices of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) – a de facto Croat national movement – 
on the occasion of the high delegation’s visit to the capital of the newly autonomous 
Croatia. The second meeting took place in Brčko, present-day Bosnia, and was 
convened and attended by local Serb leaders and clergymen.  
The commonly accepted interpretation of interwar Yugoslavia rests on many 
‘truths’, but does not explain developments such as these. This chapter offers an 
analysis of the ‘Serb question’,1 and, more broadly, challenges some perceived 
notions about the Yugoslav kingdom. It is important to stress that in interwar 
Yugoslavia non-Serbs had been subjected to Serb domination; not just Croats and 
Slovenes, but also, and especially, Macedonians (officially regarded as ‘Southern 
Serbs’), ethnic Albanians and even Montenegrins, most of whom, regardless of their 
political affiliation, viewed themselves as members of a wider Serbian nation.2 This 
chapter does not attempt to argue otherwise. Instead, it suggests that divisions also 
existed within ethnic groups and that there were Serbs who opposed the government 
and non-Serbs who participated in it. Specifically, the chapter looks at the neglected 
issue of Serb dissatisfaction with Yugoslavia in the second half of the 1930s. 
 
Context 
In order to understand the emergence of the Serb question and, more specifically, to 
contextualise the two events of January 1940, it is worth revisiting earlier 
developments. Conflicting visions of Yugoslavia among Serb and Croat political 
leaderships appeared even before the country was formed in December 1918 and led 
to the emergence of the Croat question soon after the unification. However, the 
conflict between mostly-Serb centralists and mostly-Croat and other non-Serb 
federalists was but one aspect of the political contest. Inter-party and even intra-party 
rivalries and alliances – regardless of ethnic affiliation – were just as important, as 
were intra-ethnic conflicts, especially among Serbs. Serb-Croat conflict was one 
important dimension of the political dynamics of the period – this chapter 
acknowledges that – but was not the only one. Rather than view the period as one of a 
constant struggle between Serbs and Croats, interwar years might be seen instead as 
an era when a series of attempts towards an agreement between Serbs and Croats were 
made.3 
Contrary to what is sometimes argued, views of leading Serb and Croat 
politicians had not been fixed in mutual antagonism by 1918, but had evolved during 
the interwar period. For instance, Stjepan Radić, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, 
advocated republicanism and boycott of the Belgrade parliament in the early 1920s, 
but in 1925 entered government of his chief rival Nikola Pašić, of the Radical Party, 
and praised King Alexander. Two years later Radić left the government to form the 
opposition Peasant Democratic Coalition, together with another former rival, Svetozar 
Pribićević, leader of the Independent Democrats. This was essentially a coalition 
between Croats and Croatian Serbs and it lasted longer than any other political 
alliance in Yugoslavia. Radić had also previously briefly collaborated with Ljuba 
Davidović of the Democratic Party. (Pašić, Pribićević and Davidović all had been 
ethnic Serbs). Following Radić’s assassination in summer 1928 by a Radical Party 
deputy, Yugoslavia’s democratic institutions entered a final crisis. On 6 January 1929 
King Alexander abolished the Constitution, the parliament and political parties, and 
introduced a dictatorship.  
In the early 1930s the regime unsuccessfully sought to reach a compromise 
with the Croats. Belgrade wanted Vladko Maček, Radić’s successor, to publicly 
support the government, and, preferably, join it, before any changes within the 
existing order should be considered. Maček’s position, on the other hand, was that a 
separate Croat identity must be recognised first, by granting Croatia self-rule.  
As neither side was prepared to back down, a united Serb-Croat opposition 
began to emerge in the early 1930s, despite the regime’s intimidation of the 
opposition and arrest of Maček and Pribićević, among others. Moreover, mistrust and 
disagreements, especially among the main Serbian opposition parties – the 
Democrats, the Radicals (Aca Stanojević’s opposition faction) and the Agrarians –
slowed down the formation of a common opposition front. After the assassination of 
King Alexander in October 1934, by Croatian and Macedonian revolutionaries, the 
dictatorship was relaxed by Prince Regent Paul, who ruled in the name of Alexander’s 
minor son, King Peter II. At the (quasi democratic) elections of May 1935, the 
Democrats and the Agrarians presented a joint list with the Peasant Democratic 
Coalition and the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation – the main Bosnian Muslim party. 
The list was headed by Maček and, although it failed to win the elections, the 
opposition did better than it had been expected. This prompted Prince Paul to bring 
about a change of government and start negotiations with Maček. The new 
government included the Radicals’ pro-regime faction, the Slovene Clericals (the 
major Slovenian party) and the Yugoslav Muslims, who would soon merge into a 
single party – the Yugoslav Radical Union (JRZ). However, Milan Stojadinović, the 
new Prime Minister, was unable and possibly unwilling to persuade the HSS to join 
the new party or the government. Maček met the Prince Regent on several occasions 
during this period, but their clandestine talks came to nothing.  
After the failure of negotiations with the regime, the Croat leader turned again 
to the Serbian opposition, while maintaining contacts with the Royal Court. The 
cooperation between the Peasant Democratic Coalition and Serbia’s United 
Opposition would reach its peak in 1937-38: the (opposition) Bloc of National 
Agreement was formed in October 1937, demanding a return to democracy and a 
solution to the Croat question; Maček visited Belgrade in August 1938 to be greeted 
by some 100,000 Serbian supporters; the Serb-Croat opposition led by Maček nearly 
defeated the (Serb-Slovene-Muslim) government in another quasi democratic 
elections of December 1938. This Serb-Croat collaboration in opposition contributed 
to the fall of Stojadinović in February 1939, although the Yugoslav Radical Union 
remained the government party, now led by Dragiša Cvetković.  
Eventually, Maček reached an agreement (Sporazum) with Prime Minister 
Cvetković and the Crown in August 1939, but this resulted in the end of the united 
democratic opposition. The agreement was based on a compromise: there was to be 
no return to democracy, but an autonomous Croatia was set up and the Peasant 
Democratic Coalition entered the government. Prince Paul was widely seen as the 
most responsible for Belgrade finally granting Croatia self-rule. It was no surprise that 
his first visit to autonomous Croatia in January 1940 provoked such excitement and 
public approval. ‘It is thanks to your wisdom that you realised that the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia could only be saved by granting the Croats their demands, and it is thanks 
to your courage that you acted like a real man by cutting the Gordian knot in a single 
blow’, Maček told Paul in Zagreb, before continuing: ‘It is for these reasons that the 
Croatian people welcomes you today with open arms and wishes you, through me, a 
happy stay [in Croatia]. Long live the Prince Regent, long live Princess Olga!’4  
The visit was meant to show popular support for the Croatian Peasant Party, 
the government and the Crown, but there were also genuine signs that Yugoslavia 
faced a more stable future. Yet, a careful observer might have noticed that the main 
reason for the Croats’ newly-found enthusiasm was undoubtedly partly due to the 
Croatian banovina (province) turning into a quasi nation-state. Maček welcomed the 
Prince Regent to ‘the capital of Croatia and all Croats, in the name of all Croats’.5 
Civil servants and teachers were being replaced by the new authorities – not so much 
because they were predominantly Serbs, often from prewar Serbia, but because they 
were associated with the previous regime; their replacements were mainly Croats 
loyal to Maček. In the first two months of 1940 over 20 new associations had been 
registered on the territory of the banovina, most of them with the prefix ‘Croatian’.6 
At the same time, attacks on organisations and individuals closely connected with the 
previous regime, whether they were Serb or Croat, intensified.  
By the time of Prince Paul’s visit to Zagreb, many Serbs from the Croatian 
banovina had joined in what had grown into a pan-Serb ‘movement’, encouraged, if 
not organised, by the Serbian Orthodox Church, nationalist intelligentsia and most 
‘Serb’ political parties. The movement was unofficially known as ‘Serbs, rally 
together!’. The Brčko meeting, referred to above, was an example of the pan-Serb 
(re)action to the Cvetković-Maček Agreement. However, even during this period, a 
homogenous Serbian front failed to materialize.  
It would be wrong to suggest that the Serb question emerged simply as a 
response to Croat autonomy. The first major conflict between Serb nationalism and 
the Yugoslav state took place two years earlier, during the ‘Concordat crisis’ of 
summer 1937. 
  
Church vs. State: The Concordat Crisis 
In July 1935, thirteen years after they had first started negotiations, the Yugoslav 
government and the Vatican signed a Concordat regulating the position of the Roman 
Catholic Church in Yugoslavia.7 The government hoped to attract Croat support at the 
expense of the HSS and saw the Concordat as a way of solving the Croatian question. 
As Prime Minister Stojadinović told the parliament in summer 1937: ‘the Concordat 
means agreement. Who with, gentlemen? With the Holy See. Who does the Holy See 
represent? It represents 400 million [Roman] Catholics, 5 million of whom live in our 
state.’8 However, when the document was finally submitted to the parliament for 
ratification in July 1937 the government nearly fell. The Serbian Orthodox Church 
instantly objected that the Concordat was concluded at its expense. It argued that 
although there were more Orthodox than Roman Catholic believers in Yugoslavia, the 
latter were placed in a favourable position by the state.9  
Street protests led by Orthodox priests broke out in Belgrade and other Serbian 
towns. Particularly violent was the so-called ‘bloody procession’ of 19 July, when a 
procession praying for Patriarch Varnava’s health (he was seriously ill at the time) 
turned into anti-government demonstrations. Serbian churches displayed black flags, 
church bells tolled intermittently, while crowds shouted ‘the police have killed our 
bishop!’, when the news spread that one of the bishops leading the procession was 
taken to a Belgrade hospital after a gendarme hit his metal Episcopal crown and 
allegedly damaged his skull.10 The bishop luckily did not die – it turned out he only 
received minor injuries – but other casualties were reported. The gendarmerie 
responded with violence, charging with bayonets and firing guns in the air. 
Stojadinović and Serbian members of the government were excommunicated by the 
Church. Shouts djavo (‘devil’ in Serbo-Croat, a play on ‘vodja’ (leader), as 
Stojadinović liked to be called) and Jereza (a nickname for the JRZ, which sounds 
similar to Serbo-Croat for ‘heresy’) suddenly gained additional meanings.11 
The Patriarch died only hours after the Concordat was ratified on 23 July. 
Although rumours that he had been poisoned by the regime were unsubstantiated, 
even traditionally good relations between the Church and the Crown were strained. A 
royal emissary who had enquired about the Patriarch’s health was told by 
Metropolitan Dositej that the Patriarch’s death was imminent, and that it was 
unfortunate he was dying on the same night when the Concordat was being voted in. 
‘But God is just!’, Dositej added, raising his voice. 12  
The rumours, as often the case in interwar Yugoslavia, played a major role in 
turning the public against the government; the difference this time was that the public 
was predominantly Serbian. The funeral was attended by thousands of mourners, 
including representatives of the Crown – but not government – as well as 
representatives of Yugoslavia’s Muslim leaders, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and 
Serbian opposition parties. The authorities banned a proclamation issued by the 
Serbian Church on the eve of the funeral, in which the Patriarch’s death was 
compared to that of King Alexander: two great patriots who died for their cause, at the 
time they were most needed by their people.13  
Despite the brutal police action, Stojadinović believed that in dealings with the 
crisis an even firmer position should be adopted. Foreign newspapers reporting on the 
crisis were either bought off by the government or simply returned unsold, while a 
long-serving Belgrade correspondent of the Reuters was no longer welcome in the 
country. The government allegedly also considered a clampdown on opposition 
leaders.14 
The government was forced to back down due to public pressure, withdrawing 
the document from further parliamentary procedure in late July. Stojadinović 
explained that by signing the Concordat the government ‘sought to secure religious 
harmony in western regions of our country’; however, under the circumstances, ‘it 
would not be wise to disturb religious harmony in eastern regions of the country’.15 
Nevertheless, tensions remained high and clashes between the gendarmerie and 
opponents of the Concordat continued throughout the summer. One such incident took 
place on 15 August in Mladenovac, a small town south of Belgrade. When a crowd 
besieged the house of a local government deputy who had voted for the Concordat, 
the gendarmerie intervened brutally, killing two or three people (depending on the 
source) and wounding several.16 
Seen in retrospect, the Concordat crisis was a prelude to the emergence of the 
Serbian question two years later. However, although the demonstrations were partly at 
least inspired by Serbian nationalism, many demonstrators simply wished to express 
their dissatisfaction with the government.17 Meanwhile, the crisis did not undermine 
significantly the relationship between the Croat and Serb opposition. The Serbian 
parties kept a relatively low profile during the crisis, careful to not antagonise their 
partners in Zagreb. Maček, on his behalf, sent a message to his Serbian counterparts, 
stating that if the opposition succeeded in forming a new government, he would 
propose the Concordat to be taken off the agenda. ‘We Croats do not need a 
Concordat, nor do the Serbs’, Maček stated.18 Maček was aware that Stojadinović’s 
tactics were to win sympathies among the Croats and erode the support for the HSS. 
When Stojadinović mentioned, during their meeting in January 1937, that he intended 
to ratify the Concordat, Maček replied: ‘I am not interested in that issue, but can tell 
you in advance: if you support the Concordat, I shall oppose it’.19 Moreover, the Croat 
leader did not regard the Serb-Croat conflict as a religious one, and believed that 
religion had no place in politics. In an earlier statement, he explained that Croats were 
‘a Catholic, but not a clerical nation’.20 
 
An autonomous Serbia? 
After August 1939 it became clear that eventually the rest of the country would be 
further divided up according to ethnic criteria, reversing King Alexander-inspired 
internal division of October 1929 (see Map 1). The same day the Cvetković-Maček 
Agreement was concluded a ruling on implementing the Decree on the Formation of 
banovina of Croatia in relation to the rest of the country was also issued. It stated that 
the decree ‘of 26 August 1939 could be extended to other banovinas by royal decrees. 
In such a case, banovinas could [either] unite, or their territories could [be subject to] 
changes.’21 The extent of the autonomy of future banovinas would equal the level of 
autonomy of Croatia. However, it was unclear how many new banovinas there would 
be and where their boundaries should be drawn.  
The potential for disagreement in regard to the territory of the future Slovene 
unit was minimal, since Dravska banovina was a de facto Slovenia. Soon after the 
creation of the banovina of Croatia, Slovene leader Anton Korošec suggested that a 
Slovene banovina be proclaimed, as well, and a special working group was formed 
within the government to discuss the proposal.22 However, nothing came out of this 
initiative because Croats and Serbs regarded all other issues as secondary to the Serb-
Croat question. If Dravska was turned into Slovenia, then how could the government 
continue to postpone the creation of a Serbian banovina, and would not have the rest 
of the country automatically become de facto a greater Serbia? Maček always 
believed that Serbs and Croats formed the main axis in Yugoslavia. Therefore, sorting 
out their relations was of utmost importance; all other issues could wait, including the 
question of Slovenia.23 Similarly, Serb members of the government wanted to wait for 
an agreement on the Serbian banovina first, before ‘upgrading’ Dravska, possibly at 
the same time. Cvetković complained that Slovenes’ insistence on a Slovene banovina 
was nothing less than ‘blackmail’ and that the Slovene leaders ‘did not have a [wider] 
feeling for the state’. The Croats got their banovina, the Slovenes de facto have had 
theirs in form of Dravska since 1929, but ‘what have the Serbs got?’, Cvetković 
wondered.24 The Slovenes, however, felt in the late 1930s that their loyalty to the state 
had not been rewarded properly. Slovene leaders were allegedly criticised by their 
voters, who complained that ‘the Croats are against this state, and still they got 
everything, whereas we are loyal to the state but got nothing!’25  
The key question was where to draw the borders of the Serbian banovina. 
Would it include the whole of Yugoslavia, minus Slovenia and Croatia? This seemed 
to be Cvetković’s plan, and many Serbs, though not all, argued in favour of such an 
outcome. On 16 December 1939 Mihailo Konstantinović, a minister without portfolio, 
delivered to Prince Paul a ‘project on the banovina of the Serbian lands’.26 The entity 
would be created by the unification of Vrbaska, Drinska, Dunavska, Moravska, Zetska 
and Vardarska banovinas into a single province, the capital of which was to be Skopje 
(Belgrade would remain the capital of Yugoslavia); the former banovinas would enjoy 
a semi-autonomous status within Serbia.27 The future Serbian entity would enjoy the 
same level of autonomy from the central government in Belgrade as Croatia, where, 
however, there was to be no regional, ethnic or religious autonomy, despite large 
numbers of Serbs and Muslims living there. Just like Croatia, autonomous Serbia 
would be in charge of its finances, justice, education, social policies, while the central 
government would be responsible for defence, customs and foreign policy.28 It 
remains unclear whether the authors of the document envisaged the inclusion into a 
future Serbian banovina of those territories previously parts of Vrbaska, Zetska and 
Dunavska which since August 1939 had formed part of the banovina of Croatia. 
Maček repeatedly stated that the boundaries of the Croatian banovina were 
temporary and that he was looking to add more territory. He used the opportunity of 
Prince Paul’s visit to Zagreb in January 1940 to raise this question, but it is unclear 
what was Paul’s response.29 Maček may have been under pressure from more radical 
elements within his party and from the Frankist opposition to try and further extend 
Croatia’s territory. The pro-Maček press argued that the banovina of Croatia should 
incorporate Bosnia and parts of Vojvodina, although Maček was personally 
apparently satisfied with the terms of the 1939 Agreement.30 
It was the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina that posed another major problem. Up 
until 1929 Bosnia had been fictionally preserved within the Yugoslav 33 
administrative units system, but borders of King Alexander’s banovinas put an end to 
this. As the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation began to demand autonomy for Bosnia in 
1939, was there going to be a fourth, Bosnian banovina, as the Democrats’ leader 
Ljuba Davidović proposed in 1933, and as the government considered briefly in 
1939?31 Most Croats and Serbs seemed to prefer a division of Bosnia among 
themselves. The Croats believed that the so-called ‘Turkish Croatia’ (most of 
Vrbaska) should be joined to the Croatian banovina. Although the area did not have a 
Croat majority, the Croat ‘state right’ argument was used to justify Croat demands, as 
well as economic and geographic factors. The Independent Democrats supported this 
view, but because they believed that a greater number of Serbs in Croatia would 
strengthen the position both of the Serb minority and of their main party. The 
Democrats, on the other hand, seemed prepared to offer autonomy to Bosnia. 
Davidović repeated his argument of early 1933 that a Bosnian province should act as 
a buffer between Serbs and Croats, possibly together with southern Dalmatia. At the 
same time, the Yugoslav Muslims started a campaign for a Bosnian banovina and the 
restoration of historic Bosnia.32  
Meanwhile, many Serbs argued that Bosnia should be part of a future Serbian 
banovina. The Serb Cultural Club, whose representative in Banja Luka was Stevan 
Moljević,33 was most radical in this respect – according to Moljević and his 
colleagues, Bosnia was undoubtedly a Serbian ethnic territory. The Croatian Peasant 
Party demanded that parts of Vojvodina should be added to the Croatian banovina, on 
the basis both of ethnic and historic rights. Vojvodina had been another bone of 
contention during the negotiations between Cvetković and Maček, but because it had 
played an important role in Serbian nineteenth century history, and also because of a 
large number of Serbs living there, all Serb parties and groups regarded it as part of a 
future Serbian banovina.34 
Discussion about and calls for the creation of a Serb entity in the post-1939 
Yugoslavia was not confined to political parties: local politicians, Orthodox clergy, 




On 11 March 1940, Zagreb authorities requested all civilian and police officials to 
report about the ‘“Serbs, rally together” movement, that is about the movement for the 
secession of [predominantly] Serbian districts from the territory of the Croatian 
banovina.’35 The Brčko gathering, referred to at the beginning of this chapter, was 
organised as part of the ‘movement’, which emerged across the banovina soon after 
August 1939. Serbian Orthodox priests were often among its leaders, petitioning for 
the secession of predominantly-Serb areas or areas they perceived as Serb from the 
Croatian banovina. Father Zdravko Borisavljević, a priest from the village of Vinjska, 
was a key speaker at the Brčko rally. He claimed that in the post-agreement 
Yugoslavia ‘Serb freedom is forbidden, the Serb gusle36 are forbidden, the Serbian 
song is forbidden, even in Belgrade, but not by Serbs. Serbs must fight against being 
insulted and against being a minority’, arguing also that there was an economic 
discrimination against Serbs, who were allegedly paid less than non-Serbs in 
Croatia.37 
Local politicians, merchants and other leading Serbs from Derventa, Brčko, 
Bosanski Šamac and Gradačac also spoke at the rally. Most speeches were similar in 
tone, although none so blatantly nationalist as Father Borisavljević’s. The opening 
speech by Milorad Kostić outlined the complaints and demands of those Serbs who 
opposed the 1939 Agreement, as well as their position vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. Kostić 
explained that the main reason for the meeting was to discuss ‘the question of saving 
Yugoslavia’s unity and [creating] a strong Serbdom, because without a strong 
Serbdom there would be no [Yugoslav] state.’38 Kostić argued that Prime Minister 
Cvetković was not the Serbs’ legitimate representative, adding that Serbs were not 
against an agreement with Croats, because without it Yugoslavia could not survive, 
but they wanted an agreement which would ensure they were equal to Croats. 
Therefore, they should be united in a Serbian banovina which would include all areas 
of Bosnia populated by Serbs and by Muslims, because, according to Kostić, the latter 
were in fact Serbs.39 ‘Dr [Juraj] Krnjević [a Croat leader] called the Serbs a minority, 
but they cannot be that in their own state’, Kostić said, before rejecting any possibility 
of autonomy for Bosnia: ‘the Serbs [of Bosnia] fought for the unification with Serbia, 
so there cannot be an autonomous Bosnia.’40  
Where the ‘ethnic’ argument could not apply, those who called for the 
secession of areas they regarded as ‘Serb’ employed ‘historic’ arguments. For 
example, some Serbs from the municipality of Mostar called for the secession of the 
region and its inclusion in the Serbian banovina on the basis of Herzegovina’s 
apparent mediaeval Serbian past. ‘As the sons of the Vojvodina of St. Sava, we 
demand the secession of the city of Mostar from the Croatian banovina’, an 
unpublished resolution drafted by a group of Mostar Serbs stated.41  
The pan-Serb movement spread beyond Bosnia-Herzegovina. For instance, 
Serbs from the Glina area south of Zagreb, led by two local priests and a teacher, 
issued in November 1939 a resolution calling for the secession of the region from 
Croatia. The following month they held another meeting, but this time issued a more 
moderate statement, demanding merely full equality with Croats.42 Serbs from Knin, 
Benkovac, Obrovac and Šibenik also petitioned for the secession of predominantly 
Serb areas and their unification with the Vrbaska banovina.43  
Although the movement was widespread, its supporters often had local goals. 
Thus, the Serbs from Vukovar had ever since the creation of autonomous Croatia 
demanded the transfer of their district to the jurisdiction of the Dunavska banovina. 
Their leader was Nikola Teodorović, a secondary school teacher and a leading 
member of the local branch of the government party.44 However, the pan-Serb 
movement failed to attract a mass following in the area,45 just like it eventually failed 
to attract mass support elsewhere. 
In those areas where the Independent Democrats – as noted, a predominantly 
Serb party – had significant support there had been less opposition to the Agreement 
and Serb-Croat relations tended to be significantly better. This was not surprising, as 
the party genuinely supported a Serb-Croat agreement and had, publicly at least, 
always stood by the Croatian Peasants. On the day Croatia became autonomous, the 
Independent Democrats’ leadership issued a statement praising the Agreement, 
describing it as the ‘crowning of our efforts’.46 In areas dominated by the Independent 
Democrats, even local priests, generally among the most radical advocates of the Serb 
cause, supported the Agreement. This was the case in the central Bosnian town of 
Bugojno, where, according to a contemporary account: 
 
Relations between Croats and Serbs are very good, even cordial. The leader of 
the local Serbs, most of whom are supporters of the SDS [Independent 
Democratic Party], is a priest, Jovo Popović, who has established an honest 
and brotherly cooperation with [local] Croat representatives […] so that their 
relationship is virtually ideal.47 
 
The same account noted divisions among local Muslims. Some were pressurised into 
joining the Croatian Peasant Party, while others, members of the Yugoslav Radical 
Union, simply did not know where their allegiances belonged anymore. In any case, 
many hoped that Bosnia would achieve some form of autonomy, perhaps even its own 
banovina.48 
After the initial wave of protests across Serb areas in banovina Croatia the 
situation calmed down. Once it became clear that the Serb movement had failed to 
change the situation significantly, it lost its appeal. Contemporary accounts note that 
after the busy autumn, by spring 1940 activities of the ‘movement’ decreased 
markedly.49 Once the initial shock was over, many Serbs came to accept the new 
order. However, this did not mean that dissatisfaction among them went away – it was 
still there, but was not as visible as had been the case during the first few months 
following the Agreement.50 One of the reasons was a more sensitive approach by the 
Croat authorities. Aware that the politically motivated change of civil servants and 
other personnel had gone too far, Croatian ban [governor] Ivan Šubašić sent a circular 
in June 1940 to all local civilian and police authorities ordering them to cease firing 
staff without good reason.51  
The Croat leadership had done little to prevent the often indiscriminate 
removal of Serb personnel from the local administration, police and schools. For 
example, the replacement of a Serb teacher by a Croat colleague in Veliko Korenovo, 
a predominantly Serbian village near Bjelovar, a town east of Zagreb, was hard to 
justify. It caused a small rebellion among the population of the village, who occupied 
the school and refused to leave until their old teacher was reinstated. The villagers 
insisted they had nothing against the Croats in general nor against the new, Croat, 
teacher personally, but were only protesting ‘against those few [Croats] who wanted 
to get rid of [Serb teacher] Bogojević for their own, personal and material reasons’.52  
The official report on the incident concluded that the villagers’ protest was 
justified and that it was hard to understand why Bogojević was removed. The 
authorities were eventually able to end the protest by promising to investigate 
properly the whole case.53 Although the Bjelovar authorities tackled the crisis with 
tact and fairness, Bogojević’s case caused enough damage and gave credence to the 
frequently heard calls for Serbs to unite in common action.  
There were cases where Serbs initially did not oppose Croatian autonomy, but 
the new authorities’ insensitive policies created Serb resentment. ‘We accept 
banovina of Croatia, we support the agreement of 26 August 1939 and accept it as the 
basis of the future reorganisation of the [Yugoslav] state’, claimed Serbs from the 
Benkovac district. ‘We accept and welcome every word by the Croatian ban Dr Ivan 
Šubašić, but we cannot accept what the […] HSS activists are doing on the ground. 54 
The new Croat authorities made unsuccessful attempts to re-Croatianise the 
language,55 introduce a separate currency (kuna) and even a coat-of-arms. Not only 
Serbs, but moderate members of the HSS opposed such suggestions. 56 Although none 
of these proposals were implemented in practice, rumours that they would be led to a 
rise in tensions among the Serbs, already ultra sensitive following the formation of 
autonomous Croatia.  
Economic factors contributed to the dissatisfaction of ordinary Serbs, as well 
as Croats, with the new authorities. In Croatia, like in the rest of the country, small 
landowners formed the vast majority of the land-owning peasantry. The percentage of 
small landowners in Croat areas was even higher than in Serb areas of the country.57 
The peasants were heavily in debt: the percentage of owners of land smaller than 10 
hectares who were in debt was over 93 per cent in Savska and as high as 97 per cent 
in Primorska (by comparison, in Dunavska it was 83.4 per cent and in Drinska 84 per 
cent). On top of the problem of debt, the price of food in Croatia rose by between 50 
per cent (beef) and 100 per cent (flour, potato, beans) in the period between August 
1939 and August 1940.58  
Remarkably, the new authorities did little to address this problem. Although 
the Croatian Peasant Party was above all concerned with the national question, 
functioning more like a national movement than a political party, it had also based its 
campaign against Belgrade and local gentry on the argument that Croatia, with its 
predominantly peasant population, was economically exploited. So, it was highly 
ironic that when a group of Croat peasants forcibly entered Maček’s farm at Kupinec 
in August 1940 in order to cut forest trees, Maček called upon the once hated 
gendarmerie to get rid of intruders, his own Peasant Defence having refused to 
intervene against the peasants.59 Later that year, a public rally organised by Maček’s 
party in Podgora was disrupted by dissatisfied peasants who complained that the party 
had promised that, once the Croatian question was solved, they would not have to pay 
tax and that the number of bureaucrats would be trimmed down, but that in reality 
‘[we] are today hungry and don’t have enough bread.’60 
The economic crisis and the failure of the Croatian Peasant Party to deal with 
social issues unsurprisingly made people sympathetic to the Communists. Reports 
from the period particularly note growing ‘communist action’.61 Some however went 
over to the other extreme, joining the ustašas in the case of Croats, or various Serb 
groups that were united under the ‘Serbs, rally together’ banner in the Serbian case. 
The regime’s brutal measures against political opponents could not halt the growing 
dissatisfaction with the governing party in Croatia.  
The situation was additionally complicated by the governing Yugoslav Radical 
Union’s support of and even direct involvement in the Serb movement. Although the 
party formed the backbone of the Cvetković-Maček government, many of its Serb 
members worked to undermine the Croatian banovina. Teodorović, the 
aforementioned leader of the Vukovar Serbs, who campaigned for the secession of the 
town from Croatia, was a member of the party with close links to its senior 
members.62 The support to the Serb cause by the Yugoslav Radical Union, which 
often contradicted the 1939 Agreement, was not limited to local party officials. Even 
Cvetković himself apparently sponsored and gave editorial suggestions to a 
newspaper of the Croatian Serbs that openly criticised the agreement he reached with 
Maček.63 One of the reasons for Cvetković’s action could be his dissatisfaction with 
the way the Croat press close to Maček reported Yugoslav politics, and the 
Agreement in particular, insisting that it was only a ‘first step’ – leaving it open to 
interpretation what the next step would be for Croatia.64  
The rivalry between ‘Serb’ parties for leadership among Serbs, which 
intensified after the Agreement, was not limited to those parties participating in the 
government. Božidar Vlajić, a leading Democrat, believed that his party was best 
suited to unite the Serbs. At the time of Prince Paul’s visit to Zagreb in January 1940, 
Vlajić conceded that gathering the Serbs in a united front was ‘outside the scope of 
regular party business’, but necessary under the circumstances. Vlajić suggested that 
the Democrats may be best suited for such a job, given their record in working toward 
‘the solution to our state problem in the form of a representative government and the 
agreement between the Serbian people and Croatian people.’65 
 
The Serb Cultural Club 
Serb dissatisfaction with the post-1939 order was due to several reasons, insensitive 
policies on behalf of new local (predominantly Croat) authorities, lack of legitimacy 
of the Cvetković-Maček government, and social-economic factors chief among them. 
As argued in the Srpski glas (Serbian Voice), the organ of the Serb Cultural Club 
(SKK) published in Belgrade, Serb dissatisfaction was not simply invented from 
above. While acknowledging that there were certain Serb advocates who were not 
well qualified to represent Serbian interests, the author of the article argued that ‘those 
who think that the present mood among Serbs is an artificial product of the 
propaganda’ are seriously mistaken.66 However, Serb nationalism, not only of the type 
propagated by the Serbian Orthodox Church, played a significant role, too. Nobody 
represented this nationalism better than a group of intellectuals gathered around the 
SKK.  
The SKK was registered in Belgrade in early 1937 (six months before the 
Concordat crisis and two and a half years before the Sporazum).67 Its members 
included leading Belgrade intellectuals, such as Slobodan Jovanović. Initially its 
activities were mostly cultural, but this changed following the Agreement, when the 
Club’s branches sprung-up across the Serb-populated areas of Croatia, Bosnia and 
Vojvodina. At this time the Club’s main, if not sole, aim was to define and defend 
Serbian interests in Yugoslavia. This ‘think tank’ of the Serbian intellectual and 
professional élite sought to overcome party divisions among Serbs and probably came 
closest to representing the pan-Serb cause in the late 1930s.68 
The first issue of the Srpski glas, edited by the sometime left-wing writer 
Dragiša Vasić,69 came out on 16 November 1939 and the last on 13 June 1940, when 
it was banned by the authorities, for its criticism of the Agreement.70 While stating 
that it was not opposed to an agreement between Serbs and Croats, ‘which has always 
been necessary’, the newspaper criticised the Cvetković-Maček agreement for 
endangering the state unity and for being incomplete; it claimed that, unlike the 
Croats, the Serbs were not properly represented in the government. Moreover, the 
paper called on all ‘Serb’ parties to halt inter-party rivalry, for which ‘there was a 
place in prewar Serbia, and which may have its place in a [future] separate Serbian 
unit, if Yugoslavia is eventually turned into a federation, but such rivalry does not 
have a place at the moment when the question of Serb-Croat relations is raised.’71  
The newspaper argued that just like the Croats, who approach politics from a 
national point of view, the Serbs should agree on a single national programme, which 
may be possible without all the parties uniting into a single one.72 This was not far 
from Maček’s view that the Serbs, like the Croats, should have a single party or leader 
who would represent their interests. While the Croat press had often in the past 
accused the monarchy, the army and the government of being ‘Serb’, none of them 
had actually represented Serbs, certainly not the same way the Croatian Peasant Party 
represented Croats, as Maček was well aware.  
The SKK rejected King Alexander’s integral Yugoslavism, calling instead for 
Serb unity and a return to old ‘Serbian’ values – the same values which had 
apparently characterised the Serb nation before Yugoslavia had been formed. The 
editors of Srpski glas argued: 
 
Recently, one can hear from different sides the slogan ‘Serbs, rally together’. 
We too believe that Serbs should rally together, but we hasten to add that 
merely rallying together is not going to be enough unless at the same time the 
old spirit does not wake up inside the Serbs, the same spirit which used to 
inspire their strength and greatness in the past, that same faith in the national 
ideals and that same manly decisiveness to sacrifice everything else for the 
sake of those ideals. What we need today is a moral revival. Within its limited 
powers, our paper will serve that revival.73 
 Despite an increasingly Serb nationalist discourse, the SKK did not reject Yugoslavia 
as a state. Its members argued that Yugoslavia could only be strong if ‘Serbdom’ was 
strong, not weak and divided. Indeed, the motto of Srpski glas was ‘Strong Serbdom – 
strong Yugoslavia’.74 Slobodan Jovanović, the Club’s chairman, argued in an article 
published in the newspaper that Serbs had a twofold role in post-1939 Yugoslavia: to 
defend Serbian interests, but also to make sure that the central government functioned 
and that Yugoslavia became stronger not weaker.75 In the same article, he also argued 
that Yugoslavism was not incompatible with Serbian and Croatian nationalisms. He 
saw Yugoslavism as a state idea, whereas Serbianism and Croatianism were national 
ideas.76 Jovanović believed that Serbs and Croats should revert to the original 
Yugoslavism of the Illyrians, which was a reaction against a threat from an external 
enemy (Hungarians). According to him, Yugoslavia should be based on the self-
interest of Serbs and Croats to live in a common state, which would best protect them 
from their neighbours and bigger powers.77 Again, this was not unlike Maček’s own 
view of Yugoslavia – a union of close, but separate peoples, not a Yugoslav nation-
state.  
Yet, even in the post-agreement atmosphere, when the Serbian question 
virtually replaced the Croatian one, the position Srpski glas took – another article 
began with ‘It is time for a pure Serbian voice to be heard’78 – provoked strong 
criticism from a number of prominent Serbs. The paper started a polemic with a rival 
publication apred (Forward), published by a group of Serbian federalists led by 
Mihailo Ilić, a constitutional expert who helped draft the Decree for the Formation of 
the banovina of Croatia and a vocal proponent of federalism. Arguing that most 
Yugoslavs – but particularly Serbs – did not understand the real meaning and 
advantages of federalism, the group around Ilić compared the situation in Yugoslavia 
to the one in the United States in 1787, when leading thinkers debated the federation 
and explained its meaning to the public.79 Aware that most Serbs probably feared that 
the federalisation would weaken the state unity and could even lead to disintegration, 
editors of apred argued that, 
 
Conscious of all political, national and cultural components [that have formed] 
our country and [as] defenders of their rights and aspirations, we remain 
supportive of a single and strong state […] which would preserve and 
encourage all different [identities]. We have always been, like the old 
Federalist once was in America, for this form [of state, i.e. federation], 
because it means a desire for unity of all those groups which do not want and 
cannot accept unitarism. Because now, as then [in 1787], ‘federalism means a 
true unity and leads to a more complete national harmony’, as [Alexander] 
Hamilton said.80  
 
It were not just the Serbian federalist intellectuals around the apred paper that 
opposed the SKK. For instance, Dragoljub Jovanović, one of opposition leaders who 
had campaigned for an agreement with the Croats throughout the 1930s and who 
spent time in prison for criticising the regime, argued with his former mentor and 
surname-sake Slobodan Jovanović over the post-1939 developments. Slobodan 
believed the Serbs made a mistake by not making any concessions to Croats for so 
long, but then conceded too much in 1939. He also complained that Croats looked 
down on Serbs as inferior. Dragoljub disagreed, telling the old professor: ‘You are a 
great Serb, but you must not become a Greater Serb’. One of Dragoljub’s younger 
party colleagues, who had studied in Paris where he met Julien Benda, published a 
pamphlet accusing Slobodan Jovanović of ‘intellectual treason’.81 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has offered a brief analysis of the Serb question which escalated 
following the creation of an autonomous Croatia in 1939, but had already emerged 
several years earlier. It became apparent from the mid-1930s that the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and nationalist intelligentsia were increasingly frustrated with 
developments in Yugoslavia. After the 1939 Agreement many Serbs – both those 
living in Croatia and those in the rest of Yugoslavia – sought to ‘rally together’ all 
their compatriots in an autonomous Serbian unit, while the Slovenes and Bosnian 
Muslims called for the creation of their own banovinas. By the tenth anniversary of 
the 1929 dictatorship, King Alexander’s integral Yugoslavism was all but abandoned, 
even by many Serbs, normally seen as inherently integralist. 
Three factors led to the escalation of the Serbian question in the aftermath of 
the Cvetković-Maček agreement. First, a large number of Serbs were included within 
the boundaries of the banovina of Croatia. Secondly, what started on 26 August 1939 
was most likely the federalisation of the country, which to many Serbs amounted to a 
prelude to disintegration. Third, the agreement marked the de facto end of integral 
Yugoslavism. It is usually overlooked that not all Serbs embraced King Alexander’s 
integralist ideology, not to mention the Serb parties’ opposition to the royal 
dictatorship. However, the Serbs, as the largest and geographically the most scattered 
Yugoslav ‘tribe’, were generally happier than other Yugoslavs to live in a centralised 
state in which only one, Yugoslav, nation officially existed. With the abandonment of 
integral Yugoslavism, the question of a Serb identity within Yugoslavia arose. (It may 
be argued that the problem exists in present-day, post-Yugoslav Serbia). 
If the solution of the Croat question led to the opening-up of the Serbian one, 
and put an end to the democratisation of the country, the beginning of federalisation 
promised to bring long-term stability. By the late 1930s a decentralised state became 
acceptable to many Serbs, not only to non-Serbs. When Yugoslavia re-emerged in 
1945, it was as a federation, albeit a non-democratic one. The South Slav state had 
never been a democratic federation in some 70 years of its existence, so it will never 
be known whether such form of government would have led to stability and ultimately 
to the preservation of the common state. However, it is probable that had the 
Yugoslav kingdom not been formed along such strict centralist lines, the interwar 
period may have been less volatile. If the enthusiastic reception in Zagreb, described 
at the beginning of the chapter, had taken place twenty years earlier, it is possible that 
things would have been different. Without the Croat question, the Serb question might 
not have emerged either. The South Slav state might not have survived the Axis’ 
assault in 1941 in any scenario, but with a more harmonious interwar period, the 
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